Norman H. Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Norman H. Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company
of Utah : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mark S. Miner; Wendell R. Jones; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Utah, No. 7347 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1125
7347 




STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN H. JiO·RDAN, 
PlaiJntiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
c.o·CA-DOLA B·OTTLIN1G OOM-
PANY o~F UTAH, a corporation, 
Defendant arnd Appellant. 
~7 1f L: ~ ~K s. MINER, 
.ll Jl j~~··! ~NDELL R. JONES 
_. 
AUG : ~ 19t.--9 4ttorneys for Plaintiff 
~--------------------~-----------
and Resp·ondent 
CLERK, SUPREME COURT,UTAH 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page· 
STA!~EMENT OF F.ACTS .......................................................................................... ! 
CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR .................................................................... 7 
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................. 8 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT, COCA-COLA COMPANY, BOT-
TLED THE POISONOUS BOTTLE FROM WHICH 
THE PLAINTIFF DRANK .............. ~ ............................. :................... 8 
POINT II. THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED :MORE THAN 
A~IPLE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE 
AXD WAS PROPERLY GRANTED A VERDICT BY 
THE JURY .............................................................................................. 9 
POINT III. THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED MORE THAN 
A~:f.PLE EVIDENCE FOR RECOVERY UNDER THE 
BREACH OF WARRANTY THEORY ........................................ 19 
POINT IV. THE SCOPE OF CROSS EXAMINATION IS 
NOT LIMITED WHEN DIRECTED AT THE CREDI-
JULITY, BIAS OR INTEREST OF A WITNESS ....................... 28 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Tyler, 274 N.W. 48 ............................................................................. 22 
Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 ......... ........ ...... ......................... 17 
Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23; 177 S.W. 80 ................ 24 
Gatani v. Swift & Co., 251 P. 52, 95 Alt. 931 ............................................ 21, 26 
Chapman v. Jackson Coca-Cola Co., 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 .................... 14 
Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Evansville v. WHliam.s, 27 N. E. (2nd) 
702 .................................................................................................................. 12, 17 
Cook v. Peoples Milk Co., 152 N.Y.S. 465 ............................... .12, 13, 15, 16, 17 
Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 ........ 18, 21, 24 
Dothan-Chero~ca Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. app. 639, 
80 So. 734 ............................................................................................................. 21 
Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 13 N.E. (2nd) 130 ............................ 23 
Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 77 P. (2nd) 835 ........ ~ ........................... 16 
;Fissure M.in. Co. v. Ole Susan Min. Co., 220438, 63 P. 587 ..................... ....... 29 
-Flessher v. Corsters Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 P. 14 ............................ 21 
Goldman and Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Alt. 866 14 
Haley v. Swift & Co. (152 Wis. 570) 140 N.W. 292 -. ....................................... 26 
Hertzler v. 1\fanshum, 228 Mich. 416; 200 N.W. 155 ................................ 21, 23 
·Hollis v. Ouacheta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 So. 376 ........................ 17 
Holt v. Nelson, 109 Pac. 470, 379 Utah 566 .................................................... 29 
Kelley v. Ouachita Dairy, 715 So. 199 ................................................................. 17 
Kelterer v. Armour & Co., D. C. 200 F. 322 ........................................................ 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(INDEX (Continued) 
Page 
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P. (2nd) 799 (1939) ................................ 27 
Link·er vs. Quaker Oats, 1 Fed. Supp. 794 ........................................................ 17 
Manaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. 76, 189A,, 714 ................ 26 
McCowan v. Northeast Siberian Co., 41 Wash. 675, 84 p. 614 .................... 29 
Mazetti v. Armour Co., 75 Wash. 135 p. 633 ............................................ 21, 25 
Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104 119 N.W. 
428, 131 Am. St. Rep. 44 ............................................................................ 25 
Nehi Beverage Co. v. Hall, 174 S.W. (2nd) 509 ........................................... .12, 17 
Nock v. Cooa-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super 515, 521, 156 Alt. 537 26 
Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334; 144 P. 202 ............................................ 21, 24 
Rachlin v. Tibby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. (2nd) 597 ............................ 20 
Richenbachver v. California Pac~ing Corp., 250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281 16 
Rost v. Kee, 216 Ill. App. 497 ............................................................................ 15 
Rozmailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 
Alt. 700 .................................................................................................... 13, 14, 2ey 
Salmon v. Libby McNeill & Libby, 219 Ill. 421, 76 N.·E. 573 .................... 26 
Searle v. Coca.:Cola ·Bottling Work of Lexington, 179 W. (2nd) 598 .... 12, 17 
Stewart v. Kindel, 25 P. 990; 15 Colo. 539 ........................................................ 29 
Toml,inson v. A1:mour & Co., 75 N.J. L. 748, 70 A. 314, 19 L.R.A. 
N.S. 923 ................................................................................................................ 26 
Thomas v. Winohester, 6 N.Y. 297, 57 Am. Dec. 455, 297 ............................ 11 
Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 116 So. 147 ............................ 13 
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N.E. 557 · .................................................... 21 
Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33; 87 S.E. 958 ................ 21 
Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 .................... 15, 26 
White v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 16 So. (2nd) 579 ........................................ 17 
LAW REVIEW JOURNALS 
23 ·California Law Review, 621 .......................................................................... 26 
52 Harvard Law Review, 328 ................................................................................ 26 
42 Harvard Law Rev·iew, 417 ................................................................................ 26 
46 Harvard Law Review, 162 .................................................................................. 26 
(TEXT CITED) 
Res Ipsa Loquitur by Mark Shain, 447 ................................................................ 13 
Uniform Laws Ann., Vol. 1, Pages 118, II9 ...................................................... 21 
Williston on Sales, Volume I, Page 489 ............................................................ 21 
I7 American Law Reports, 709 ............................................................................ 26 
105 American Law Reports, I5II ........................................................................ 26 
Ill Am-erican Law Reports, 1251 ........................................................................ 26 
I L. R. A. (N. S.) II78 .................................................................................... 15, 26 
STATUTES 
81-1-15 U. C. A. 1943 ................................................................................................ 20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




STATE OF UTAH 
NORMAN H. JORDAN, 
Plaitntiff and Respondent, · 
vs. 
co·cA_JOOLA BOTTLIN1G ooM-
P ANY O·F UTAH, ~a corporation, 
Defendant arnd Appellant. 
Case No. 7347 
In this brief we shall ~refer ~to the p-arties .as they 
appeared in ·the court ~hel'Ow. This statement of facts is 
given for the purp·ose of S·up·plying the court with the 
pertinent facts omitted in the defendant's hrief. 
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The undisputed and uncontradicted evidtence reveals 
that the plaintiff on or about the 5th day of October, 
19·48, purchased a hottle of coca-·cola from a coca-cola 
disp·ensing madhine owned !by the defendant which was 
lo0ated just outside of the ~achine ·shop at the American 
S·melting and Refining Company, at Garfield, Utah. This 
machine had been leased to the American ·Smelting and 
Refining 'Company, but was serviced daily, with the ex-
ception of week ends and holidays, hy defendant's em-
ploye·es. 
Standing In the plaini tiff's immediate pres:ence 
and by the ·coca-cola machine were two ·employees of the 
American Smelting and ·Refining Company, whose nam·es 
are Keith Wiseman and I.1eslie L. C'ramer. The plaintiff 
placed a ni·ckel in the machine and was immediately 
serve·d by the dispensing machine a bottle of coca-cola. 
He stepped up to the machine's bottle cap· remover and 
removed the cap and immediately dra:nk from the coca-
cola 'bottle. In the process of drinking .f:vom the ibottle 
the plaintiff swallowed one fly and a large blow-fly 
lodged in his mouth. 'rnhe eon tents of tihe bottle were 
foul, poisonous and contaminated. The plaintiff spit 
out the blow-fly that had lodged in his mouth and put 
it lhack in to the ibottle. About an hour later the plaintiff 
he·came ·dleathly sick and nauseated. For three days 
thereafter he suffered from nausea and dia.rrib.e.a. 
Keith Wis.eman, a totally disinteor·ested, subpoened 
witness, testi,fied that he saw the· plaintiff purchase the 
bottle. He further testified he saw Mr. Jordan drink out 
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of the bottle then spit the 'blo,v-fly out into his. glove-
and put the fly back into the bottle of eoca-cola. He p·osi-
tively identified the bottle of coca-cola introduced as 
plain tiff's Exhibit ' 'A' '. 
Leslie L. Cramer, who haa heen duly subpoenaed 
and who had no interest whatsoever in the outcome of 
the .suit, testified: That he was present when Mr. J·ordan 
bought the !bottle of coca-cola. He saw the plaintiff take 
.a ''swallow' ' of the eoke and then spit fue fly in to his 
lhand, then replacing the fly in the bottle. Mr. Cramer 
further testified that the three men had held the coke up, 
to the light and it could he plainly s-een that there· was, 
other foreign material present in the bottle of coca-cola. 
{R-114). 
George D. Walker, the co:ca--cola truck driver, te'S-
ti:fied that he serviced the dispensing machine fr.om which 
1; 
the plaintiff p·urchased the bottle of poisonous eoca--col.a. 
H·e further testified that he was and is employe-d iby the 
Defendant Coca-Cola Company. He stated that the trneks\ 
are loaded at the Def·endant ';g. plant on 875 South W es.t 
Temple and ·the bottled coca-cola is under his exclusive 
eontrol until p.Iaced in the machine or the Forman's of-
fice. (R-105). On re-direct he testified he le.ft coke in 
the .fore·man's. office nearly every week-end. {R-108). 
But when questioned again three ·days later on the same 
subject he testified as follows : 
Q. MT. Walker, have you left any coca-·cola in 
the foreman's office since the ~summer months' 
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A. I D,O,N'T RIDME:M:BE.R; IT'·.S BEEN A LONG 
1TlME ~GO. (R-183). 
Mr. Walker further testified that ·he ·diid not know 
of any other person s·ervicing the machine in question. 
(R-179). When asked, "\Do you know of anylbody else 
that has a right to go out and sell .c~Joca-·cola to the Amer-
ican !Sme.l ting and Refining ·Company~ '' He replied, 
''Not tihat I know of, no sir.'' He testified that he prob-
ably serviced the machine on ·O·ctoher 5, 19·48. (R-180). 
L.ester Anderson, Head Guard and F·ire ~c·hief at 
American 1Smelting and Refining ·Company, testified 
that no one could get into the dispensing machine with-
out a key. (R-t111). He further stated that there were 
only two keys to the money lhox of the machine, the one 
he had and the one held by Kelsey Rosandar. Thes·e keys 
were originally p~resented rto him and M·r. Rosandar 
by the defendant ~Company. (R-175). He further testified 
that he had never known any .company other than the 
defendant to serviee the ma.chines. (R-175-176). H·e 
also testified that the defendani Company .b:vought this 
dispensing machine from the 9th ,s.outh and West T·em-
p·le Plant. (R-177). 
Peter H·anes, the maintenance man of the defend-
ant Corporatinn, admitted under eross.-·examination, that 
if the water pressure of the waslhing machine should 
drop that the hottles would .not be p-rop·erly rinsed. (R-
134). 
Mr. Hanes made the hold statement that the de-
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fendant 's equipment was the '' 1\tlost up to date in the 
industry". (R-129). Yet on cross examination, he made 
the follo,ving answers to the foll·owing questions: (R-131) 
Q. How ·do you know there are no better plants 
• * *? 
A. I've been in a lot of plants. 
Q. D·oes the company send you around to look at 
these plants 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How do you visit them~ 
A. JUST V~SITIN\G ON MY VAC,ATIOiNS, 
ANlD WHE·NEVER I HAP,PEIN TIO B:E O·UT ·O·F 
T·O·WN. 
Raymond Wilmert, the field engineer for the Radio 
Corporation of America, testified that the electric eye 
wlhich inspects the coca-cola hottle-s would ki·ck out any 
bottle that had sediment, particles -of dust or any for-
eign suhstance,-EVEN A BUB.BL·E! 
The defendants introduced exhibit "6 n which was 
a lhottle containing a small No. 12 shot. Defendant's ex-
hiJbit "5" was a bottle containing a piece of cork and 
defendant ''s exhibit '4'' was a bottle ·Containing a bristle 
from a brush. It was testified that all of these bottles 
had heen rejected :by t~he ·electric eye. (NO EXHIBlT'S 
WERE INTRJODUCE1D BY TH·E D·EFE·ND.ANT· 
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C:OIC:A- ICOIL:A ,C;OMP ANY W·HlC'H :C~ONTAINED 
FLIE.S.) 
Donald A. ·Carmichael, the manager of tme defend-
ant company, testi.fied that the defendant company had 
an ·exclusiv·e franchise to sell bottled ·coca-cola in the 
Salt _Lake territory. (R-184). This territory includes the 
American ·,S,melting and Refining ~Company at Garfield, 
Ut~h. (R-13). In answer to the following questions, Mr. 
Carmiehael made the following ~replie-s : 
Q. 1Do you let any of these other ·companies s·ell 
·Coca..!cola in your territory' 
A. We wouldn't p·ermit them to. We wouldn't give 
them .a contract to ·do that* * *. (R-184). 
Q. But you don't p·ermit the other bottling -com-
panies to s-ell coca-cola to your customers in the .Salt 
Lake Area, would JiOU' 
A. We wouldn't authorize them to do it. 
IJ)r. Leo R. Curtis. admitte.d under cros~s-·examina­
tion that he was a f.ormer employee of Salt Lake C~ty 
of which 1\fr. ~Cihristensen, the def.endant 's attorney, is 
·employed. ·T~he Salt Lake ~City insp·ector also testified in 
the defendant's fawor. 
All witnesses presented hy the defendant company 
were ·employed ~dire·ctly or indirectly by the defendant 
ex·cept Dr. Leo R. ~Curtis and CM·r. Holding, who were 
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employed or were formerly employed 'by tihe same cor-
poration as was defendant's .attorney, E. Ray Christen-
sent. 
The plaintiff submits that the verdict of the ju·ry 
and the judgment of the trial court should still ibe· af-
firmed. The trial eourt w.as correct in ·submitting the 
cause to the jury on the theory of Res lpBa Loquitur. 
Sho-uld this court be of the opinion that the trial ·court 
di<1 err, the verdict and judgment should still he af-
firmed becaus·e had the trial court not ·erred in the rulings 
and ·orders, set forth ~below, the verdict and judgment 
would still remain the same. The plaintiff cross as-
signs the following errors made ;by the trial court: 
(1) The trial court ·erred in refusing to give plaint-
iff's requested instruction No. III to the jury. 
(2) Tlhe tri,al ·court erred in refu&ing to give 
plaintiff's requested instruction No. IV to the jury. 
( 3) The trial court erred in refusing to gi V·e plaint-
iff'·s reques·ted instruction No. V to the jury. 
( 4) The trial court erred, in refusing to plain tiff's 
requested instruction No. VI to the jury. 
(5) The eourt ·erred in not instructing the jury to 
find in favor of the plaintiff on the theory of a breach 
of implied warranty. 
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'rHE EVIDE·N·CE IS OVERWHELMING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT, C·OOA.JC:O~LA BOTTLING OOM-
PANY, B10 1TTLEJD THE PQISO~NOU·S BO·TTILE OF 
CO!C·A-C~O~LA FRO·M WHI~C:H THE PLAINTIFF 
DRANK. In this regard the ·court's attention is respect-
fully called to plaintiff's EXHIBIT "A"~ the bottom 
of which there is plainly printed '' Bettiw m ~~Salt L.ake 
City, Utah.'' It is undisputed that there is ibut one coca-
cola bottling company in ~S.alt Lake City, Utah, and that 
company is the defendant. 
It is further undisputed that the defendant com-
pany has the exclusive franchise to serve Salt Lake 
City and vicinity, which includes the American Smelting 
and Refining Company at Garfield, Utah. 
It is undisputed that the defendant'.s truck driver, 
George Walker, daily services the machine from which 
the p·laintiff took the ·eontaminated bottle. It was, 
p~roved ~beyond reasonable doubt iby testimony of Frank 
Baer, the head of the accounting division of the Ameri-
can Smelting and Re:fining Plant at Garfield Utah that 
I ' ' 
the defendant company was the only ·Company which 
had received paym·ent for ·coca-·col.a sold to the .American 
Smelting and Re-fining Company and placed in the sub-
Je·ct disp·ensing machine. 
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It is further undisputed tha.t the vending machine 
is o'vned and serviced by the defendant company. Kel-
seY Rosandar and Lester Anderson further testified that 
ol 
the only t\YO keys to the subject machine were issued to 
them by the defendant company. 1\tlr. Carmichael posi-
tively testified that he would not p·ermit any ·other ·coca-
cola bottling company to service the territory orver which 
the defendant ~company had! an e~clusive rranchise. 
The court, in instructing the jury, required them to 
:fip.d, before entering a verdict for the plaintiff, that the 
defendant company bottled and produced the coca-·cola 
put in evidence as plaintiff's EXHIBIT ''A''. It must 
be .assumed that the jury was well satisfied from the ev-
idence that the defendant company had bottled and pro-
duced the bottle of coca~cola introduced ·as plaintiff'.s 
EXHIBIT "A". It is hard for the plaintiff to compre-
hend how, after the introduction of such overwhelming 
·evidence and with the bottle its·elf having clear,ly p~rint­
ed on the bottom, "lffit~in ·~Salt ·L~ake 'City, Utah", 
that the defendant could .assert that the plaintiff had 
failed to show ~that the ·coca-cola whiCJh poisoned the 
plaintiff had ~been produced and 1bottle·d by the defendant 
corporation. 
BOINT 2 
THE PLAINTIF~F PRES·ENiTED MORE THAN 
AMPLE EVID;ENC1E 0'F DE.FENDAN'T 'S N.EGL~I­
G~E:N·CID AND: WAS PRO·PERLY GRANTED AVER-
DICT BY ·THE, JURY. 
Once again the d.e.fendant is .attempting to confuse 
the issues of this case by lb.is ''Red Herring'' cry of no 
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evidence. It shoul·d be kept in mind that the plaintiff's 
right of ·recovery is fbased upon two theorie·s: 
a. Res Ips~a I.Joquitur. 
1h. Breach of implied warranty. 
Under the two theories set-forth above the plaintiff 
presented undisputed evidence iby wholely disinterested 
witnesses that the bottle of coca-cola taken directly from 
the ·coca-cola machine, owned and stocked daily by the 
. 
d·efendant company, was ·contaminated and polluted hy 
hlow-flies and other poisonous substances. 
It be-comes undeniable that at ·Some time or place 
that ·some person had failed to exercise the p-roper care 
to prevent hlow-flies and ·other noxious matter (see EX-
HIBIT ''A'') from the infestation of this bottle of coca-
cola. 
The defendant attemp·ts to shy away from the re-
sponsibility of its I.aw imposed lialbility hy asserting that 
the defendant :company lost control of this particular 
bottle by p~lacing the same in its ma-chine which had 
been leased to the American 1S-melting and Refining C:om-
pany. 
To illustrate the possilhility of negligence of the de-
fendant company, .as well as to ex·culp·ate the other, it 
must be remembered that the ·evi{Lence fully discloses the 
fact that all bottles of coca--cola taken to the American 
Smelting and Refining were ·capped, bottled and sealed 
at the def·endant's place of ~business. In such circum-
, ' ' 
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stances it must be concluded that the unfortunate in-
cident was caus.ed by the lack of proper eare on the p·art 
of the defendant company. Such conclusion is a nat-
ural one "\vhich is deductible from the facts of the case. 
The defendant, in fue trial of the case and now in 
his brief, is attempting to cloud the issues as set up· in 
the plaintiff's complaint by trying to try this case on 
the hasis of ordinary negligence. Save with one or two 
exceptions the cases :cited in ·defendant's brief supports 
the theory of ordinary negligence and theref.ore .. are not 
pertinent to the real issues of this case. In line with 
defendant's tactics to avoid the real iss·ues the defend-
ant attempts to avoid the doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur 
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to p·rove exclusive 
control of the instrumentality causing the harm at the 
time of injury. In supp·ort thereof the ·defendant has 
cited those eases involving the furnishing and the serv-
ing of food not involving a sealed product, but ~has cited 
those cases involving the furnishing and the serving of 
food not in sealed containers. The only exception is a 
f.ew ·cases .as handed down iby the courts. o£ North ·Caro-
lina. Nearly all other states have adopted the rule :firm-
ly established since the decision of Thomas vs. Win-
chester and 6 N.Y. 297-57 Am. Dec. 455, whieh held: 
''That a manufacturer of .arti~cles. intended for human 
consumption owes a duty of care to the ultimate ·consum-
er to s-ee that they are fit for such consumption. This 
duty, as well as the ·duty ·of an inkeeper to ·exercise rea-
sonable care in the preparation and inspection of food 
being well established, the .doctrine of res ipsa l·oquitur 
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would seem particularly .appropriate in cases resulting 
from ·contaminated food, since there is usually exclu-
·sive control on the part of the manufaoturer'' * * "" 
The slightest perusal of the cases reveals that the 
overwhelming weight of authority ~has adopted the rule 
which permits an inference of negligence where the ar-
ticle for ·consumption is in a sealed container. 
In this case the bottle was capped and sealed, 
therefore, the doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur was applic-
afble since the coca-cola company is deemed to have had 
ex:clusive ·cont:r~ol. (C-oca-cola is a sealed product. S.ee 
coca-cola bottling works of Evansville vs. Williams, 27 
N.E. (2nd) 702. Nehl Beverage ·Co. vs. Hall, 174 S.W. 
(2nd) 509. Searle vs. 1Coca-Cola Bottling Works of 
Lexington, Ky., 179 S.W. (2nd) 598.) Under this the-
ory, which was, applied without question by the trial 
court, the acti~onaJhle negligence ·consists in the defend-
ant placing on the market a bottle of poisonous coca-
-cola, and the question as to how the coca-cola became 
poisoned is not p·art Df the plaintiff's case. See ·Cook vs. 
People's Milk !Company, 152 N.Y.IS. 465. 
The defendant ·Coca..J01ola Company, in selling the 
Coca--cola, 1bottJ.ed under seal, and ·delive-ring to its dis-
p·ensing machines for distribution and sale (regardless 
of whether the m·achine is leas-ed or owned outright iby 
defendant) ass·umed the obligation to the public to pro-
vide a wholesome beverage ; .and under the rule of res 
ipsa loquitur all the plaintiff need~ p·rove is that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
plain tiff purchased a bottle of coca-cola, such a.s the de-
fendant admitted placing in the dispensing machine at 
the American Smelting and Refining, and that the coca-
cola contained substances that were poisonous, and in 
drinking the coca-cola plaintiff became sick and poisoned. 
These facts, "'"hi<ili were proved to the jury's satisfac-
tion and beyond doubt, established the plaintiff's p~rima 
facie case :against the .defendant. Whether t~he disp~ens­
ing machine, from which the coca~cola was purcha8ed, 
was leased or owned ,by the defendant, or whether the 
defendant's manner of cleansing the coca-cola bottle is. 
faulty, is not material to the plaintiff's cas-e. See Cook 
vs. People's Milk Company, 152 N.Y.S. 465; Rozumail-
aski vs. Philadelphia Coca.JCola Bottling Company, 296 
Pa. 114, 145 Alt. 700. 
On the theory that care and preparation would havoe 
prevented the injury and that the manufacturer has ex-
clusive control in ''Try-me Beverage Company vs. Har-
ris'', 217, Alabama 302, ·116, ~Southern 147, the court 
clearly sets forth the general rule: '' 'Dhe P'res-ence of 
foreign matter deleterious to health and s-~aled up in a 
'bottle ~of soft drink IS EVID~ENOE OF NE\GLI-
GENOE.'' 
The text book wri~ters are in accord with the gen-
eral rule that the theory of res ip~sa loquitur applies to 
this type of case. Mark Shain in his recent hook on res 
ipsa loquitur at page 447 states: "Courts: are quite uni-
form in permitting an inference of negligence where tihe 
article f~or consumption is in a sealed container, on 
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the theory that care in preparation or insp·ection would 
have prevented the injury AND THAT THE MANU-
FACTURER HAD EXCLUSIVE CONTROL. (Empha-
sis ours). 
The Maryland Courts in adopting the 81bove rule 
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied in the 
case of ·Goldman and F·reiman Bottling Co. vs. Sindell, 
140 J\ifD. 488; 117 Atl. 866, saying: "FOR IT CER-
TAINLY'CANNOT BE ·SAID that the pres-ence of so 
dangerous a rna terial as broken glass in a !bottle of 
beverage represented as wholesome and safe, ·shown to 
be in it when sold by the manufacturer IS NOT EVI-
DENCFJ OF NIDGLI~GENCE ON HIS PART." 
In a case involving practically the same circum-
stances as the instant case, the Pennsylvania Court ap-
plied the e.s~tablished rule. The case is. titled Rozumarl-
ski v. Philadelphia ·Coca.:Cola Bottling Company and is 
found at 29,6 P.a. 114; 145 Atl. 700, here the court said: 
''Where such sUibstances get into the product, whose 
presence might possibly be due to that uncertain human 
quality,-carelessness, somewhere along the line, the 
manufacturer is responsible to a member of the Public 
injured there~by. '' 
Mississippi adop~ted and app~lied the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur and held the Coca-Cola Company lia-
ible for damage in the case of Chapman vs. Jackson 
Coca-Cola Company, 106 Miss, 864, 64 So. 791, when a 
dead mous-e was found in a 'bottle of Coca-Cola the 
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Court said: '' ,,-rhen a. manufacturer 1nakes, bottles and 
sells to retail trade, to be .again sold to the general pub-
lic, a beverage represented to 1be refreshing and harm-
iess, he is under a legal duty to see to it that in the pro-
cess of ·bottling no foreign substance shall be mixed with 
the beverage, which, if taken into the human stomach, 
will be injurious.'' Citing Watson v. Augusta Brewing 
Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152, 1 L.R.A. (NS) 1178. 
The lllinois ·Court applied the rule of res ipsa lo-
quitur to .a case presenting almost identical facts as 
the one at bar in the ·case of Rost vs. Kee, 216 Ill., App. 
497. 
In Cook vs. Peoples Milk Co., 15·2 NYS 465, the 
New York ·Courts held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
applies to sealed product~ and the manufacturer is liable 
for injuries caused hy their sealed products, the Court 
in ap~plying the general rule held: ''The actionable neg-
ligence, which is denied ;by the defendant -consists, if at 
all, in placing upon the market poiS:onous milk, and the 
question as to how the milk became poisoned is no part 
of the plaintiff's case. The defendant, in selling its· 
milk tbottled under seal, and delivered to merchants for 
distribution and sale, .assumed the obligation to the pub-
lic to provide wholesome milk; .and if the plaintiff can 
establish the fact it purchased a quart of milk, such as 
the defendant· admits having ~delivered to Mr. Emens 
(the grocery man) and tha.t such milk contained active 
dangerous poison, and that in using such milk she was 
made siek, sore, etc., SHE HAS ESTABLISHED A 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1.6 
P;RIM·A FACIE ·CASE AGAINST D:~EFE·NDANT, 
AND THE P·ART~CULAR ST·O·RE· IN W·HIC·H DE-
FENDANT PU·RC~HASED IT,S B·OTTLES, O·R MAN-
NIDR O!F rC·LEANSIN~G THE S.AJME, IS NOT M~­
TERIA~L TO PLAIN·TIF·F 'S C·ASE. '' 
The ·court continued on page 468 after placing its 
stamp of approval on Thomas V. Winchester, supra, 
which originally s-et down the foregoing rule of law, said: 
''The principle of the above case (as set forth in the 
3Jbove paragraph) has been -consistently followed hoth 
in this state and the ·Sup·reme Court of the Unit·ed Stat·es. 
(Citing numerous cases.) 
In Ricili.enibachver v. ·California Packing Corp., 250 
Mass. 19·8, 203, 13·5, N. E. 281, 282 (19r24), the doctrine 
~of -res ip~s:a loquitur. was applied to canned good as well 
as sealed bottles. In a case involving a piece of glass 
found in a ean of spinach, the Mas.sachus~etts court said: 
"'Tihe fact that the glass got into the -can during the 
p·rep·aration of the spinach and before the can wa:s 
sealed, was a -circumstance which warranted an infer-
ence that some p·erson whose duty it was to s·ee that the 
SYJs.tem was observoed was negligent. in the examination 
of the contents of the ·can hefore it was s-ealed, if not 
negligent in preventing the presence of glass at a place 
where it ·could be put or might fall into the can.'' 
In Dryden v. ~Continental B-aking C·o., 77 P (2nd) 835, 
that ·C-alifornia, in app·lying the rule of res ip1sa loquitur 
said: "J}t go-es without saying that any manufacturer 
intending his product for human -consumption should 
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exercise a high degree of care to see that his products 
do not contain any foreign substance whidh, if swall~owed, 
might cause bodily injury or death to the consumer* * ~. 
In view ·of the aboYe it seems only fair to presume that 
the presence of deleterious substances in a package of 
food occurs through some negligent act of omission or 
commission on the part of the agents of the manufactur-
er, citing Linker vs. Quaker Oats, 1 Fed. Supp. 79·4, and 
Rozumailaski v. Philadelphia ~Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
296 Pa. 114, 1145 A 700.'' 
The Court is urged to read the following cases which 
deal with facts and circumstances similar with t'his case: 
E·ach ca-se cited upholds the trial. ·court and th·e plaintiff 
by sustaining the application of the doctrine of res ip1sa 
loquitur in this type of case: 
C·oca Oola Bottling works of Evansville, Inc., v. 
Williams (1941) 37 N.E. (2nd) 703; N·ehi Beverage Co. 
v. Hall (1943) 174 S.W. (2nd) 509; Seale v. C·oea-Cola 
Bottling Works of Lexington, Ky., 179 S.W. (2nd) 59'8; 
Kelly v. ~Ouachita Dairy, 175 So. 199; Auzenne vs. Gulf 
Public Serviee Co., 181 S.·O. 54; Hollis v. Ouachita Coca-
'0ola Bottling Co., 196 S·o. 376; White v. Coea-~Cola 
Bottling, 16 S~o. ('2nd) 579· (1944). 
Should the court accept the defendant's t~heory and 
require positive evidence that the ·defendant was negli-
gent in prep~aring this particular sealed p·roduct, such a 
rule would completely deprive this plaintiff of a reme~dy 
in ·Court. It must ~he conceded that the furnishing of 
such proof is impossible. It was situations such as this 
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that resulted in the birth ·of the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur. T1he eourts 1have long recogniz·ed that the reme-
dies of injured consumers ought not ;be denied because 
·of the intricacies of the law. Every ·eonsideration of 
law and pUJblic policy require that the consumer should 
have a remedy. See Davis vs. Van ·Camp· P:acking Co., 
189 Iowa 775; 176 N.W. 382. This being a sealed prod-
uct the plaintiff respe~ctfully submits that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur applies on the theory that care in 
preparation or insp·eetion would have prevented the 
injury and that the manufacturer had exclusive control. 
(North Carolina, being the only authority to the con-
trary.) This doctrine having been properly .applied by 
the trial eourt and tll.e jury having decided that the de-
fendant was negligent in accordance with instruction 
No. 6 (R-188); and the defendant having failed to prove 
he was not negligent in accordance with instruction No. 
7 (RJ189) the jury's ·decision should stand. It is obvious 
that the jury was not impressed by evidence such as was 
introduced by Mr. Hanes, that defendant's plant was 
most up-to-date and he knew for he visited .other plants 
"ON MY V AC.ATiONS, AND WHENEVER I HAP-
PEN TO BE OU·T OF T·OWN. '' 
Mr. Wilmert':s testimony that the ·electric eye would 
ki~k out a 'bottle if it had a bubble in it was evidently 
more than the jury could "swallow". IDsp·ecially. when 
he testified the ~bottles are .spun 1500 R. P.M., then 
stopped; then s~un 3000 R.P.M., then stopped; then spun 
3000 R.P.M., then stopped, ·.and on the second stop car-
ried pa&.s the electric eye. (R-140). 
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It was evident that the jury was not too imp·re·ssed 
with the testimony of Louis R. ·Curtis, a former fellow 
employee ·of Mr. Ohristen:s·en, the d·efendant 's -attorney, 
who was ·effectively led by Mr. ·Christensen throughout 
his testimony which was obviously colored by prejudice. 
He admitted that he was ap·pearing as a paid p·rofes-
sional witness for the defendant coca-cola eomp~any. The 
testimony of Mr. Holding was likewise colored; with 
prejudice and probably had little effect on the jury. 
Under the law and facts as presented aforesaid the 
plaintiff resp·ectfully submits that the District Court 
and Jury correctly found that there was a causal chain 
stretching between the act or omission on the p·art of 
the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff and that tihe 
defendant failed to prove he was not negligent. The 
jury's vel'ldict should ;be affirmed. 
POINT 3 
THE PLAINTIFF PRE:SENTIDD MOIRE THAN 
.A!MPLE EVIDENCE WOR REC~OVERY UNDER THE 
B'REAOH OF WARRANTY THEORY. 
It is noted that the Plaintiff has cross as.signed as 
error the trial Court '·s refusal to give Plaintiff's in-
structions No. III, No. IV, No. V, N·o. VI. These in-
structions were submitted to the court in accordance with 
the Plaintiff's s·econd and alternativ·e theory set forth 
in ~the Complaint-B~RIDACH ~OF IMPLIEiD WAR-
RAN·TY. 
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In this regar-d the Court'.s attention is respectfully 
called to ~Sec. 81-1-15 U.:C.A. 19·43, ·sub-paragraph 2, 
whie;h supplies· the basic law for this contractual theory. 
Tib.is ~se·ction p·rovides that such a warr.anty exists: 
''I. Where a buyer, expressly or iby impJication, 
makes known to the .seller the p·articular purpose for 
which goods are required, and it ap·pears that the buyer 
relie~s on the seller's skill or judgment there is an im-
plied warranty ~that the goods shall he reasonably fit 
for suClh purpose.'' 
A great number of the .states that have adopted 
the Uniform Sales Act, of which ·Sec. 81-1-15, sub-para-
graph 1, U.C.A., 1943, is a part, have permitted recov-
ery under the theory of impJied warranty in this type 
of a case where food is ~served in a sealed container. 
This theory is urged upon the ~court. It is conceded that 
this eourt has never pass·ed directly upon this point. 
The trial ·court refused to instruct on the above 
theory beeau.se he said there was no privity of contract 
existing 'between the plaintiff and derf·endant. In this re-
gard, it is urged that none need exist ihHcause the bev-
erage purchased was in :a sealed -container. 
In Rachlin ·vs. Tibby-Owens-Ford Glas·s ·Com-
pany, 96 F (2nd) ·597 t·o 600, the court eommented upon 
the fact that although the orthodox rule requires privity 
of ~contra·ct between the p~arties in an action for breach 
of warranty, '' S·everal ·C:ourts :have re-cognized an ex-
ception to the gener.al .doctrine in the case of medicines 
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and food stuffs., a.nd have held a manufacturer to war-
rant tQ the ultimate consumer that the article i:s fit for 
human consumption.'' 
In Volume 1, Uniform Laws Ann. pages 118, 119, 
there is written, ''It has, however been declared that 
foodstuffs do not fall within the rule of want of p·rivity 
between the manufacurer and ultimate consumer, with 
retailer intermediate.'' Also ·see Hertzler vs .. ManS/hum 
(1924) 228 ·Mich. 4[6, 200 N.W. 155; War:d B.aking Com-
pany vs. ·Trizzino (lg.28), 161 N.E. 5·57. 
Likewis·e, in Willision on Sales, Volume 1, Page 
489, the author stated that in the more modern and up 
to date cases the courts have imp·osed aJbs,olute liability 
of a warrantor on the manufacturer in favor of th·e ulti-
mate purchaser. (Citing, among other authorities, D:oih-
an Chero-Cola Bottling 'Company vs. Weeks., 16 Ala.'· 
app. 639, 80 ·So. 734; Davis vs. Van Camp Packing Com-
pany, 189 Iowa 77·5, 17~6 N.W. 382, 17 A.'L.'R. 649·, Barks 
VS'. Yost Pie ·C:ompany, 93 Kan. 334 144 P. 202 L~RA 
1915 ·C 179; W.ard vs. Morehead City S·eafood Comp·any, 
171 N·C 33, 87 ·S.E. 958; 'Catani vs.. Swift & Company, 
251 Pa., 5~2, 95A93ll, RA 1917 B 1272; Maz,etti vs. Ar-
mour Oomp·any, 75 Wash. 6·22, 135 p 6·33, 48 LRA, N~S 
213; Fle·ssher v.s. C'Orstens Packing Company, 93 Wash. 
48, 160 P. 14. 
In the ·Case of W:ard Baking 'C·omp·any vs. Trizzino, 
27 Ohio App·. 475, 161 N.E.. 557, the court in dealing 
with this p·robJ,em, held: "The groceryman, who is in; ef-
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furnished by ·the Baking Company, ·having full knowl-
edge of the fact dealt with each other and entered into 
a ~contractual relationship for the benefit of the plliblic 
which is the Ultimate ·Consumer. In other words, this 
·contract 1between the groceryman and the W!ard Baking 
·Company, to all intents and purposes was a contract en-
tered into for the benefit of a third party, to wit, the 
Ultimate ·C·onsumer. '' The Court continued: ''Consider-
ation of ~public policy ·demand that the utmost ·care and 
·caution be extracted from the manufacturer of articles 
of food, who not only manufactures the same, hut causes 
the ·same to be delivered to grocerymen for the purpose of 
general distribution to ~the general public. THE 010N-
·SUMER HAS A RIGHT TO RE~LY ·ON THE IM-
PLIED RE·PRE·SENTATIIO·N IOF THE BAKING COM-
PANY THAT THE.SE ARTLC!LE:S BElARING ITS 
N.&ME ARE. NOT ONLY FREE FRO:M INJ·URI~OUS 
SUBS·TANC·ES, B:UT ARE FIT F;O·R CON·SUMP-
TlON AS F~O~O·D. (Emphasis ours). 
And in the ·case entitled Anderson vs. Tyler, Iowa, 
274 N.W. 48, 50, it was held that the duty of a manuf-ac-
tt,~ ·r is "to .see to it that food p.roducts put out hy him 
are, wholes·ome ''; that the implied warr.anty that such 
products were fit for use ·:r.an with the sale, and to the 
public, for t~he bene.fit of the consumer, rather than to 
the. wholesaler or retailer; and that privity of contract 
was not controlling. 
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In Pow D·rug Co. vs. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 
N.E. (2d) 130, 13-5, it was said: "That there is a liabil-
ity upon a negligent manufacturer \Yho sells articles 
kn·owing they are intended for resale to s~uhpurchas·ers 
is clear from the trend of modern aut·horities. T:he only 
controversy is as to the 'basis of the liability, some 
holding ·that the implied warranties are made for the 
benefit of the subpurchasers and form the basis of lia~ 
bility. (Citing cases.)" 
Likewis·e, in the case entitled Hertzler vs. Manshum, 
2·28 Mich. 416, 200 S.W. 155, 156, which wa.s an action 
against both the miller and a retailer of flour, for .death 
caused by the presence of arsenate of lead in the said 
flour, which had heen use·d in the preparation of food 
eaten (by the deceased, the court said: ";D·efendant Han-
ehett contends f.or no liability under th·e general r11le 
t:hat the manufacturer of an article or commodity sold 
a retail dealer is not liahle to a subs~equent prurchas·er 
upon an implied warranty for injuries due to defects 1or 
impurities therein. This general rule is based on w.ant 
of contractual relation. BUT FOODSTU·FFS DO NOT 
F .A·LL WITHIN THE RULE O~F WANT OF PRIVI-
TY BETWEEN THE M·AN,UF AC·TURER AND ULT'I-
MATE OON.S~UMER, with a retail deal-er intermedia.f~j;. 
* * * The implied warranty, .so called, reae;hing from 
the manufacturer of foodstuffs to the ultimate puroh1ts-
er for immediate consumption is in the nature of a rep-
resentation that the highest degree of care has (been ex-
erci·sed, * * *. We are fully persuaded that the manu-
facturer of foodstuffs is liable to respond in damages to 
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the purchaser ther·e-of, for immediate consumption, in-
jured by a .foreign poisonous substance therein; that the 
retail .dealer may be joined as a party defendant; and 
the liability -of ~both may ·he counted on in tort for negli-
gence OR BREAC'H ·OF IMPLIED WARRANTY AS 
MENTIONE~D.'' (Emphasis ours). 
And in Davis vs. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 
775, 176 N.W. 382, 389, 17 A.L.R. 649, it was held that 
one seeking ·damages. from a food manufacturer for in-
juries ·Caused hy eating unwholesome food was not com-
pelled to el·ect between implied warranty and negligence 
as a ground for recovery. In that case also it was con-
tended hy the defendant packing company that there 
could ibe no w:arr:anty, express or implied, because ther·e 
was no privity ·of contract ·between the defendant and 
plaintiff. There the ·court said : ''The remedies of in-
Jured consumers ought not be made to depend upon the 
intricacies of the law of sale~. The obligation of the 
manufacturer should not he based alone upon privity of 
contract. * * * every consideration of law and public 
p·olicy require that the consumer should have a remedy," 
* * * In the case of Parks vs. iC. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 
334, 1144 P. 202, L.R.A. 1910, 179·, 181, * * * The court 
·says: ''..A manufacturer or dealer who puts human 
food up·on the market for sale or for immediate con-
sumption ·does so upon an imp1ied representation that it 
is whole.some for human consumption'' * * * In Boyd vs. 
Coca-~Oola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 ·S.W. 80, 
tih-e ·Court said: '' * * * ~Some of the cas-es pla;ce the Iia· 
~hility on the grounds. heretofore stat·ed; others say there 
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is an implied warranty 'Yhen goods are dlispensed in 
original packages, w··hich is available to all damaged by 
their use; and another case says that the liability rests 
upon the .demand of .social justice.'' * * * We are of 
opinion that the duty of a Illanufacturer to see to it that 
food products put out by him are wholesome, an·d the 
implied warranty that such products are fit for us~e runs 
with the sale, and to the public, for the benefit of the 
consumer, rather than to the wholesaler or retailer, and 
that THE Q~UE·STION OF PRIVITY O·F CONTR~q·T· 
IN SALE!S IS NO·T ~OONTROLLING, and does not 
apply in such a case.'' (Emphasis ours). 
Also, the case entitleCL Mazetti v.s. Armour & Co., 75 
Wasih. 622, 135 P. 6-33, 48 L.R.A., N.S., 213, Ann. Cas. 
1915·0, 140. In ·discussing the question of liwbility of the 
meat p·acker the court said: ''Although the cases differ 
in their reasoning, all agre·e that there is a liability in 
such cases irrespective of any privity of contract in the 
sense of immediate contraot between the parties. * * * 
Our holding is that, in the absence of an express w·ar-
ranty of quality, a manufacturer of food products un-
der rnodern conditions impliedly W'arrants his goods 
when dispensed in original packages, and that such war-
ranty is available to all who may be damaged by reason 
of their use in the legitimate chwnnels of trade. 
The f.ollowing are among the more reeent cases hold-
ing that the ultimate consumer may hring 'his action di-
rect against the manufacturer: Meshhesher v. C1hannel-
lene ·Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 ·Minn. 104, 11~ N.W. 428, 131 
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Am. St. Rep. 441; Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J. L. 
748, 70 A. 314, 19· L.R.A., N.S., 923; ·Salmon v. Libby, 
MeN eill & Libby, 219 Ill. 42,1, 76 N.E. 573; Haley v. Swift 
& 1Co. (152 Wis. 570), 140 N.W. 2·92; Watson v. Augusta 
Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 6·2 S.E. 152, 1 L.R.A., N.S. 
1178, 110 Am. St. Rep. 157; Ketterer v. Amnour & Co., 
D. '0., 200 F. 322. * * * 
And in the ease entitled Manaker v. Supplee-
Will.s.-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa., 76, 189 A. 714, 715, it 
was held that: ''A manufacturer who puts upon the 
market £ood intended for human consumption in a 
sealed bottle or original package is held to rep·resent to 
each purchaser, even though the purchas:e is made 
·through a third dealer, that the .contents thereof are 
wholesome and suitable for the purpose for which they 
are sold. Noek v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, !102 Pa. 
Super. 515, 521, 156 Alt. 5;37; Rozumailski v. Philadel-
phia ·Coea-'Cola Bottling ·Co., 296 P~a~ 1114, 145, Alt. 700; 
1Cantani v. Swift & tOo., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Alt. 9~31, L.R.A. 
1917B, 1272. '' 
T:he question here under ~consideration also has 
been the subject of review in the various. law journals. 
Flor eomments, s.ee: 42 Harvard Law Review, 417; 46 
Harvard Law Review 162; 5'2 Harvard Law Review 328; 
23 California Law Review 621. See generally: 17 A.L.R. 
709 105 A.L.R. 1511 ; 111 A.L.R. 1251. 
It will fbe seen from .a r·eading of the foregoing au-
th:orities that the· modern trend p~ermits. a consumer to 
recover, for injuries re.ceived in ·Consuming poisonous 
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foodstuffs from a sealed container, from the manu-
facturer. 
It is apparent that a bottle of coca-cola which is 
full of flies and other foreign substances (see p·laintiff's 
exhibit "A") is not fit for human consumption. Th.at 
the plaintiff became deathly sick_ from consuming the 
poisonous coca-cola is disclosed 'by the ·evidence. Certain-
ly thi·s evidence and the abundance of adjudicated cases 
directly in point herein certainly sup·ply an abundance 
of authorities for the affirmation of the judgment giv-en 
by the District Court herein. 
In ·conclusion the court's attention is called to the 
case of Klein vs. Duchess Sandwich Co., 9·3 P (2nd) 799, 
a 1939 case in which the Cali£ornia Supreme Court after 
a careful analysis of the ca.Hes held: 
"In adop·ting the statute here concerned as 
a part of the Uniform Sales act, it was the cleat 
intent of the legislature that, with r·esp·ect to 
foodstuffs, the implied warranty provision there-
in contained should inure t~o the benefit of any ul-
timate p·urohaser or consumer of food; and that 
it was not intended that a striet "privity of con-
tra·ct" would be ·essential for the bringing of an 
acti·on by ~such ultimate consumer for an asserted 
!breach of the implied warranty.'' 
It is su!bmitte·d that the plaintiff's theory of breach 
of implied warranty i·s amply supiporte·d iby authorities 
and is based up·on sound p·rinciple. The trial court 
should have instructed the jury in accordanee "ith 
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plaintiff's instructions 3, 4, 5 and 6. Had the trial court 
1done so-the result would have remained the same, 
therefore it ~s contended that the jury's verdi·ct sihould 
!be affirmed on hoth theories set forth in plaintiff's oom-
plaint. 
POINT 4 
THE 8'00PE 10 1F CR01SS EXAMINATlON IIS 
NOT LIMITED WHEN J)IREC:TED AT THE CRED-
IBILITY, BIAS OR INTE·RES:T OF A W:ITNEBS. 
It is indeed gratifying to the p~lain tiff to find that 
the def·endant Coca-.Cola Company, after a two-day trial 
resulting in a 110 page transcript of evidence was so 
lacking in grounds for appeal that they have devoted 8 
p~ages of the preeious space in their brief to complain of 
~wo questions asked by plaintiff's eoun6el on cros:S-exam-
ination. (The defendant sets forth three questions-but 
as revealed by t_?e reeord at page 144 the defendant did 
n~ot obj·eet to p·laintiff's question asked Raymond Wilmert. 
Not having 0 1bjeeted, the defendant is certainly not now 
entitled to eomplain.) 
Every witness produced by the defendant was ad-
mittedly bias and prejudiced. C:ertainly the plaintiff 
wajs entitled to question the witnesses -concerning their 
in tere.st and bia~s in this suit. If Mr. Hanes. is a paid 
professional witness who ·earns his livelihood by testify-
ing for the defendant -company, the jury was entitled to 
know this fact .and to consider this bias in weighing his 
testimony. On the other hand if Mr. H·olding is a per-
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sonal friend ·of Mr. Moreton and te:Stifies 'daily for him 
the jury was also entitled to know and weigh his te~sti­
mony accordingly. 
Our Utah courts have alwaJls permitted any ques-
tion to he ·asked ·on ·cross examination which tends to 
test veracity or credibility and this court has directed 
that the courts s·hould he especially liberal WJhere such 
queS'tion is aimed to show )bias or prejuCLiee. See Holt v. 
Nelson, 109 Pac. 470, 37 Utah 5·66; Fissure Min. Co. v. 
Ole Susan Min. ~co., 220438, 63 P. 587. The que;g~tions 
complained of: 
(I noti·ce that your .attorney is che-cking your 
questions. quite carefully with the transcript. 
Rave y;ou te.stified a good deal in thes·e cases~) 
(Y,ou have been subpoenaed before t·o testify 
in these ·case·s for Mr. Moreton, ihaven 't you?) 
(R. 159). 
were aske-d for the purp·ose of showing that defendant ':s 
witnes.se.s were bias and p·rejudice.d. It is submitted that 
they were a p~roper p~art of cross examination. Possible 
inference.s and tender feelings have ne·ver abrogated the 
long esta!hlished rul·e permitting inquiries of t~hi:s type 
and nature. S·ee :Stewart v. Kindel, 25 P. 990; 15 Colo. 
539; McCowan v. Northeast Si~herian Co., 84 P. 6:14; 41 
Wash. 67'5. 
It should he noted that in hoth of the instances 
complained of ·hy the defendant the court ordered the 
question stricken and instructed the jury to disregard 
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it. If the question was in error, which the plaintiff de-
nies, the error was -certainly wiped out by the court's 
ruling and ins,truction. 
It is submitted that the verdict rendered by the jury 
in District Court should he affirmed. 
Res.p·ectfully s111bmitted, 
1\fARK s. MINER 
wEND ELL R. JONES, 
.Attorneys for PlxWntiff 
and Respondent 
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